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KANT ON FORMATIVE POWER
The notion of a formative power is one of the most obscure inKant’s theory of biology1. Before I discuss Kant’s biological use ofthe term ‘formative power’, in section 1 of this paper I provide alist of all passages in which Kant uses the term, claiming that theolder meaning of ‘formative power’ in Kant’s writings is an epi-stemological one, whereas the biological meaning of the term ap-pears not before the mid-1780s. I present and discuss some ofthose passages in closer detail, and give a precise interpretation ofthe most central passage in Kant’s philosophy of biology in §65 ofthe Critique of the power of judgment2. I defend the view that, forKant, the formative power is a basic, immaterial, and intrinsicnatural power in the organism belonging to an account of finalcausation. As a cause, it does not generate form and matter, or thematter of organisms, but only the end-directed teleological formof the matter of an organism. As an alternative to White’s3 claim
1 For recent inquiries see H. van den Berg, Kant on vital force. Metaphysical concerns ver-
sus scientific practice, in E.-O. Onnasch (ed.), Kants Philosophie der Natur. Ihre Entwick-
lung im Opus postumum und ihre Wirkung, Berlin - New York, De Gruyter, 2009, pp. 115-136; G.F. Frigo, Bildungskraft und Bildungstrieb bei Kant, in ibid., pp. 9-23; T. Cheung, Der
Baum im Baum. Modellkörper, reproductive Systeme und die Differenz zwischen Leben-
digem und Unlebendigem bei Kant und Bonnet, in ibid, pp. 25-50; B.C. Look, Blumenbach
and Kant on mechanism and teleology in nature: the case of the formative drive, in J. Smith(ed.), The problem of animal generation in early modern philosophy, Cambridge, Cam-bridge University Press, 2006, pp. 355-372; J.R. Richards, Kant and Blumenbach on the
Bildungstrieb: a historical misunderstanding, «Studies in the history and philosophy ofbiological and biomedical sciences» 31 (2000), pp. 11-32, and see also Id., Early theories
of development: Blumenbach and Kant, in The romantic conception of life, Chicago - Lon-don, University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 207-237; H. Müller-Sievers, From preforma-
tion to epigenesis/self-generation in philosophy: Kant, in Self-generation: biology, philoso-
phy, and literature around 1800, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000, pp. 26-64;and T. Lenoir, Kant, Blumenbach and vital materialism in German biology, «Isis» 71(1980), pp. 77-95, and Vital materialism. Blumenbach, Kant, and the teleomechanical ap-
proach to life, in The strategy of life. Teleology and mechanics in nineteenth century Ger-
man biology, Dordrecht - Boston - London, Springer, 1982.2 CPJ, 5:374.21-6.3 See D.A. White, Kant’s notion of a purpose, «Studies in philosophy and the history ofphilosophy» 30 (1997), special issue: Final causality in nature and human affairs, ed. byF.R. Hassing, p. 137.
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that ‘form’ means species, and Richards’4 opinion that ‘form’ is asynonym for (a mistaken notion of an) ‘archetype’, I defend theview that ‘form’ means the necessary directedness of the featuresof a being towards its purpose. A purpose is the unifying idea of anorganism in our consciousness, and an ectype of its archetype inGod’s consciousness.Reading the formative force as form-giving allows for a morecareful analysis of Kant’s famous tree example in §64, which I in-vestigate in section 2. The self-generation of a tree with regards toits species, as an individual and in its parts, does not generallyimply the generation of form and matter of a tree, or in particularthe generation of its matter, but only the causation of the form ofthe matter of a tree. In section 3, I briefly outline consequences ofmy interpretation for a placement of Kant’s position within theo-logical and philosophical accounts of organic generation. I claimthat although the formative power as a form giving capacity in theorganism is a natural epigenetic power, this does not rule out asupernatural preformistic interpretation of the creation of matter,and also not a supernatural creation of the formative power. Theformative power of nature can be read as a secondary cause insupport of the primary cause of God’s creation, and Kant’s posi-tion as mediating between philosophy and theology.
1. Kant on formative power
1.1. Two uses of ‘formative power’The term ‘formative power (bildende(n) Kraft)’ appears in four-teen passages within the whole Kantian oeuvre5. Only two of thosepassages – CPJ 5:374.21-6 in §65 and CPJ 5:423.12-424.6 in §81 –belong to Kant’s published writings, though only passage CPJ5:374.21-6 in §65 refers to Kant’s own account, whereas the pa-ssage CPJ 5:423.12-424.6 in §81 refers to contemporary positionsof Kant’s own time, especially Blumenbach’s. All other appearances
4 See J.R. Richards, Kant and Blumenbach on the Bildungstrieb cit., p. 28.5 There are, of course, more passages in which Kant discusses epigenetic conceptions ofpowers under varying names, for instance a «capacity for […] formation [Bildungs-
vermögen]» (CPJ 5:371.25) in §64 of the CPJ, and a «generative power [Zeugungskraft,
zeugende Kraft]» in his two early writings on races (Races 2:435.1-436.8, Human Race8:98.11-99.12). In §81 of the CPJ, he mentions Blumenbach’s «formative drive [Bildungs-
trieb]» (CPJ 5:424.34) in a review of epigenetic positions. Furthermore in §58 he talksabout a chemical version of «formation [Bildung]» (CPJ 5:348.11, 21, 25; 349.1; 350.1).The boundary but also the worth of the following investigation is its concentration onthose selected passages where Kant precisely uses the term «formative power». Furtherstatistics could follow up including more related passages.
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occur in lectures, notes, reflections, fragments – texts which Kanthimself did not authorize for publication. The notion ‘formativepower’ is a rare term. Nevertheless, placed at the center of §65,the formative power might be an indispensable part of Kant’s ac-count of biological causation.Reading all fourteen passages results in a surprisingly clearpicture of two different treatments of the notion ‘formative power’ inKant’s writings. Let us begin with a list of these passages:
Lectures on metaphysics (Met. L1)(1) 28:230-40 mid 1770sepistemology(2) 28:276 mid 1770sepistemology
Reflections on metaphysics(3) 17:736, refl. 4811 phase τ 1775-6?, μ 1770-1?epistemology
Reflections on anthropology(4) 15/I:95, refl. 251 phase ν11771?, ρ1 1773-5?, φ1 1776-8,χ11778-9epistemology(5) 15/I:127, refl. 321 phase λ 1769-70?, ξ 1772?epistemology(6) 15/I:383, refl. 872 phase υ 1776-8epistemology(7) 15/II:699, refl. 1484 phase σ 1775-7epistemology
Lectures on moral philosophy (Moral Mrongovius)(8) 27/II.2:1498 1782epistemology
Reflections on metaphysics(1) 18:574, refl. 6302 phase ψ2 1783–4biology
Critique of the power of judgment(2) §65, 5:374 1790biology(3) §81, 5:423-4 1790biology
Lectures on metaphysics (Met. K2)(4) 28/II.1:761 early 1790s
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Opus postumum(5) 21:475 1786-98biology(6) 21:630 1798-9biologyThe earlier meaning appears in eight passages and belongs to
epistemology. Seven of these passages stem from the 1770s, one ofthem from the early 1780s. In this early (pre-critical) view, Kanttreats the notion ‘formative power’ as a source of the spontaneousproduction of mental representations in human beings (sevenpassages) and in the animal’s mind (one passage). The term ‘forma-tive power’ designates a productive force of our consciousness tospontaneously generate representations, on both the sensual andthe conceptual level. In its most elaborate version Kant distingui-shes six kinds of spontaneously generated sensual represen-tations: re-formations (Abbildungen), post-formations (Nachbildun-
gen), and pre-formations (Vorbildungen), in-formations (Einbil-
dungen), anti-formations (Gegenbildungen), and ex-formations(Ausbildungen) – beside two kinds of spontaneously generated con-ceptual representations: concepts (categories) and laws of under-standing. I briefly demonstrate this in Kant’s text.In the lectures on metaphysics from the mid 1770s6 the term‘formative power’ designates an activity of the sensual faculty ofthe human mind that spontaneously produces sensual representa-tions: «knowledge that has its origin in the spontaneity of the con-sciousness is called: knowledge of the formative power [Er-
kenntnisse, die aus der Spontaneität des Gemüths entspringen,
heißen: Erkenntnisse der bildenden Kraft]»7. The formative power isan «imitated knowledge of the senses [nachgeahmte Erkenntnis der
Sinne]», which is a capacity «to produce knowledge out of our-selves that nevertheless has the form according to which objectswould affect our senses»8.This sensual kind of formative power is a capacity of sensual re-collection or anticipation of objects of experience. It encompasses
6 Met. L128:230-40.7 Met. L128:230.21-2.8 «Erkenntnisse aus uns selbst zu machen, die aber dennoch die Form an sich haben, nach
der Gegenstände unsere Sinne afficiren würden» (Met. L128:235.17-21).
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six subordinate kinds of sensual representations, three of whichare temporally distinct: the capacity of «re-formation [Abbildung]»generates «representations of the present time [Vorstellungen der
gegenwärtigen Zeit]», the capacity of «post-formation [Nachbil-
dung]» reproduces «representations of the past time [Vorstellun-
gen der vergangenen Zeit]», and the faculty of «pre-formation[Vorbildung]» anticipates «representation of the future time [Vor-
stellungen der zukünftigen Zeit]»9. Three further subordinate kindsof a spontaneous, sensual capacity named ‘formative power’, arethe «capacity of in-formation [Vermögen der Einbildung]», the «ca-pacity of anti-formation [Vermögen der Gegenbildung]», and the«capacity of ex-formation [Vermögen der Ausbildung]»10.Beside a capacity of sensibility, the formative power also de-scribes a conceptual capacity, which spontaneously produces con-cepts of understanding:How do the concepts of understanding come into our head? We haveknowledge of the objects of intuition by the means of the formative pow-er […]. If this formative power is abstract, it is the understanding. Takento be abstract the conditions and actions are pure concepts and catego-ries of understanding […]. All supreme principles of understanding a pri-
ori are general rules. They express the condition of a formative power inall appearances, on the basis of which we can determine how appearan-ces are to be combined with each other.11Three of these six subordinate kinds of the sensual formative power,namely post-formation (Nachbildung), pre-formation (Vorbil-
dung), and in-formation (Einbildung), are also mentioned in ashort reflection on anthropology12: «Formative power. Post- andpre-formation. Information. without or with consciousness [Bil-
dende Kraft. Nach- und Vorbildung. Einbildung. ohne oder mit Be-
wustseyn]»13. An epistemological meaning of ‘formative power’can be found also in the postscript of Kant’s lecture on moral phi-
9 Met. L128:235.26-31, see alsoMet. L128:230.1-3.10 Met. L128:237.1-28.11 «Wie kommen aber die reinen Verstandesbegriffe in den Kopf? Von den Gegenständen
der Anschauung haben wir Kenntnisse, vermöge der bildenden Kraft […]. Ist diese bildende
Kraft in abstracto, so ist es der Verstand. Die Bedingungen und Handlungen in abstracto
genommen, sind reine Verstandesbegriffe und Kategorien des Verstandes […]. Alle obersten
Grundsätze des Verstandes a priori sind allgemeine Regeln, welche die Bedingung der bil-
denden Kraft in allen Erscheinungen ausdrücken, mit denen wir bestimmen können, wie die
Erscheinungen untereinander zu verknüpfen sind» (Met. L128:239.13-29).12 Refl. 321; phase λ 1769-70?, ξ 1772?.13 Refl. Anth. 15/I:127.2-3.
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losophy written by his student Christoph Cölestin Mrongovius(1764-1855), who began to study in Königsberg in 1782. This isthe only passage with an epistemological meaning of ‘formativepower’ from the early 1780s. Also in this lecture, Kant mentions asensual, spontaneous ‘formative power’ that he specifies as ‘in-forma-tion (Einbildung)’. It is a capacity to produce imaginations and re-presentations even if corresponding objects are not present in ex-perience. Kant concedes to those imaginations more appeal on ourconsciousness than to objects given in experience:We do not have the greatest in-formations and forms (images) based onthe affection of objects, but based on our formative power […]. Objects,which cause forms (images) in us, are not always present. Only in-for-mation can be constantly present.14Kant does not continue to use the notion of ‘formative power’ asan epistemological term after the beginning of the 1780s. Al-though he pursues developing the notion of a spontaneous pro-ductive capacity of the human consciousness that originates con-cepts and laws of understanding in his critical philosophy – promi-nently in his first Critique (1781/7) – he does not name this activity‘formative power’ any longer. It is also interesting to note that thesensual capacity, which Kant describes as a formative spontane-ous power in his pre-critical notes, remains the only spontaneouspart of the sensual capacity of our consciousness in the critical pe-riod15 beside a receptive part of it (space and time as forms of in-tuition).The second, and for the aims of this paper more interesting,meaning of the notion ‘formative power’ appears in six passages;one of them stems from the early 1780s, five from the 1790s on-wards until Kant’s latest notes. All six passages belong to the fieldof biology. Different from the epistemological uses and meaning ofthe term, which overlap partly at least in some of the passages, thetextual basis for the biological use of the term is more fragmenta-ry, cryptic, and inconsistent. The contents and backgrounds ofthose six passages are so divers that they can hardly be used to in-terpret each other. Thus, I only consider the oft-cited passage in
14 «Die größte Einbildungen und Bilder haben wir nicht von dem Reitz der Gegenstände,
sondern von unserer bildenden Kraft […]. Die Gegenstände, die die Bilder in uns machen,
sind uns nicht immer gegenwärtig, allein die Einbildungen können uns immer gegenwärtig
seyn» (Mrongovius 27/II.2:1498.29-33).15 See Einbildugskraft (CPR A 78/B 103).
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§65 of the Critique of the power of judgment, since it is the only au-thorized and, therefore, most authentic source for our under-standing of Kant’s own biological conception of a formative power.In this passage, Kant treats the ‘formative power’ as a naturalforce that is responsible not for creating or generating organizedmatter but for establishing and sustaining the organized teleologi-cal order or form of organized beings16.The crucial passage in §65 consists of only one intricate sen-tence:[a] An organized being is thus not a mere machine, for that has only a
motive power, [b] while the organized being possesses in itself a forma-
tive power, [c] and indeed one that it communicates to the matter, whichdoes not have it ([d] it organizes the latter): [e] thus it has a self-pro-pagating formative power, which cannot be explained through the capacityfor movement alone (that is, mechanism).17The sentence entails the following five claims: a) the formativepower distinguishes organized beings from machines with whichthey share motive powers; b) the formative power belongs to theorganized being in itself; c) the formative power is communicatedby the (organized) being to materials (matters), materials do nothave formative power; d) when communicated to materials theformative power organizes a being; e) the formative power is aself-propagating formative power.What do these claims mean? a) An organized being is partlyidentical with a machine, namely insofar as it possesses motivepower. But it differs from a machine insofar as it possesses a for-mative power which cannot be identified with the capacity of mo-tion alone. The formative power can involve but cannot be re-duced to the mechanisms of motion. b) The formative power is an
16 The dating of the passages follows the editors of the Academy edition and the editorsof The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant. The reflections on metaphysicsand anthropology are dated by Erich Adickes (see the editorial remarks in Refl. 16:xxv-liv); the lectures on metaphysics are dated by Gerhard Lehmann (for an overview of thedates see the editorial remarks of Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon in the Cambridge edi-
tion of the Lectures on metaphysics 1997, xxii). The Mrongovius lecture on moral philoso-phy cannot be earlier written than 1782, since Mrongovius began his studies in Königs-berg in 1782.17 «Ein organisirtes Wesen ist also nicht bloß Maschine: denn die hat lediglich bewegende
Kraft; sondern es besitzt in sich bildende Kraft und zwar eine solche, die es den Materien
mittheilt, welche sie nicht haben (sie organisirt): also eine sich fortpflanzende bildende
Kraft, welche durch das Bewegungsvermögen allein (den Mechanism) nicht erklärt werden
kann» (CPJ 5:374.21-6).
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intrinsic power in the organized being. It does not externally causethe organized being (as for instance the formative power of an ar-tisan that produces the artificial object). The formative power is anatural property of and is effective in the organized being.Section c) is a difficult, ambiguous part of the sentence,which also has bearing on the different meanings of section d).The Cambridge edition translations of c) and d) fail to convey animportant aspect of the German text. The original Kantian textsays in c) and d) that an organized being has a formative power«und zwar eine solche, die es den Materien mittheilt, welche sie
nicht haben». Using «den Materien» in c), and correspondingly«welche», and «haben» in d), Kant indicates plural, i.e. he does notsuggest that the formative power acts upon matter, but upon seve-ral materials. In the Cambridge edition Paul Guyer and Eric Matthewstranslate «the matter, which does not have it». Using «matter» inc), and correspondingly «does» in d), they – at first glance – indi-cate a singular, even if «matter», as the word «Materien» in Ger-man does not exclusively designate a singular.Possible readings of Kant’s own claim, that an organized be-ing communicates formative power to materials, which do nothave formative power, are:cα) the organized being communicates the formative powerto all materials (reading «den Materien» as ‘allen Materien’), whichdo not have formative power. This non-restrictive reading sug-gests that in an organized being the formative power acts upon allkinds of matter which themselves do not have formative power.The consequence of this reading is that the formative power is it-self not material, for otherwise it would be part of matter. Theformative power then is an immaterial power. In addition, an or-ganized being that contains formative power ‘in itself’ cannot bean entirely material being, for at least its formative power is animmaterial element ‘in’ the organized being. In line with this read-ingWhite stresses «whatever form does determine a given quanti-ty of matter it is in some essential sense distinguishable from thematter it so determines»18.cβ) Emphasizing «den Materien» in the sense of ‘only those’,an alternative reading19 is that the organized being communicatesthe formative power only to those kinds of materials that do nothave it. In this restrictive reading it is possible to interpret the
18 D.A. White, op. cit., p. 134.19 I am grateful to François Duchesneau who suggested this reading.
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formative power itself as part of matter. It could be a materialpower that occupies some parts of matter (organized materials),whereas it is communicated to all other raw matter (unorganizedmaterials) that do not have formative power and that will be formedby the formative power. The distinction between cα) and cβ) isthat the formative power in cα) is immaterial whereas in cβ) it ismaterial. The ambiguity of the passage allows both readings. Frigodescribing «matter as formative power [Materie als Bildungskraft]» and«matter as formative drive [Materie als Bildungstrieb]» seems to holdcβ)20.A defender of cα), however, could object that Kant’s textsuggests at several places that the formative power as the cause ofthe purposive form of nature is analogous to the human will andthe «practical faculty of reason»21 as the cause of the purposiveform of our human actions. The human will and its faculty of rea-son is an immaterial power for Kant. This analogy between theformative power and the human will does imply that Kant a-scribes reason to nature, since, in the Kantian sense, nature doesnot have practical reason. Some of Müller-Sievers’22 remarks aretherefore misleading, for instance, when he says that the «forma-tive drive» is «the expression of a will for self-organization in na-ture». Even if the formative power is not identical with practicalreason it can be an immaterial power: Kant emphasizes that «theorganized being» communicates the «formative power» to «thematter [den Materien]», «which do not have it [welche sie nicht ha-
ben]» (my translation). He insists on the fact that the formativepower is not entailed in all materials and is not originally part ofmatter. He could have said ‘those materials (jenen Materien)’ in-stead of ‘the matter (den Materien)’ to insist on a restrictive in-stead of a non-restrictive reading. Look’s23 proposal provides in-direct support for cα). He argues that precisely since Blumenbachidentifies the formative power as a part (‘feature’) of matter, Kantthought that he had to depart from Blumenbach. Kant criticizedBlumenbach for determining the formative drive as ‘a feature of
20 See G.F. Frigo, op. cit., pp. 13, 15. Although it is not precisely clear to me what Frigo’sposition is, he seems to identify the formative power in Kant with matter. But his analy-sis of Kant’s account is not very straightforward in slipping into descriptions of Blumen-bach’s account of a formative drive and Wolff’s account of a vis essentialis.21 CPJ 5:375.24-5.22 See H. Müller-Sievers, op. cit., p. 61.23 See B.C. Look, op. cit., p. 372.
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all matter’. I am also inclined to say that cα) has more support inthe text.d) The formative power acts upon matters and thereby or-ganizes the materials. In d) Kant describes the effect of the forma-tive power: it organizes matter. The meaning of ‘organization’ isexplained in a brief footnote where Kant says that an organizedbeing is a «whole» in which each part is «not merely a mean, butat the same time also an end, and, insofar as it contributes to thepossibility of the whole, its position and function should also bedetermined by the idea of the whole»24. In an organized being,whole and part are purposes for each other:For a body [...] which is to be judged as a natural end in itself and in accor-dancewith its internal possibility, it is required that its parts reciprocallyproduce each other, as far as both their form and their combination is
concerned, and thus produce a whole out of their own causality, the con-cept of which, conversely, [...] is in turn the cause of it in accordance witha principle; consequently the connection of efficient causes could at thesame time be judged as an effect through final causes.25One effect of the formative power is that it causes the «form» and«combination» of the parts. Significant for this form of the partsand their combination is that each part «exists through the others»,which means that its form or purpose is brought about by otherparts as much as it brings about the form or purpose of others,and that other parts exist for the sake of it as much as it exists «forthe sake of the others»26. Parts do not only coexist beside eachother but with, through, and dependent upon each other, whichmeans that, for instance, the injury or functional efficiency of onepart influences the functioning of all other parts.Another effect of the formative power is that it brings aboutthe form or purpose of the whole and establishes a mutual sup-portive relation between the particular purposes of the parts andthe general purpose of the whole. The fulfillment of the particularpurposes of the parts helps to bring about the purpose of thewhole. In turn, the purpose of the whole helps to determine andfind the particular purposes of the parts. This also sheds light onthe relation between the natural laws: mechanical features of abeing might be directed, however, not directed towards a purpose.
24 CPJ 5:375.34-7.25 CPJ 5:373.26-34, the first two italics are mine.26 CPJ 5:373.35-7.
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The purposive formal relations between the mechanical featuresof organisms are caused by final causes, i.e. the formative powerin the organic beings.The most astonishing claim is e): the formative power is «a
self-propagating formative power [eine sich fortpflanzende bilden-
de Kraft]»27. Kant does not say ‘a propagating power (eine fort-
pflanzende Kraft)’; i.e. he does not claim that the formative powercauses the process of the impregnation and generation (Fort-
pflanzung) of organized beings, at least not on a material level. In-stead, he says «a self-propagating formative power [eine sich fort-
pflanzende bildende Kraft]»28. The word «self» might be read intwo ways:eα) in German ‘to propagate (sich fortpflanzen)’ is used as ametaphor to say that something spreads out or extends itself. Ifwe say that a wave, caused by a tsunami, spreads out in the oceanand along the coast, we could say: ‘Die Welle pflanzt sich im Meer
und an der Küste fort’. The domino effect of an economic crisis inone country, which causes an economic crisis in the neighboringcountries, would be another example for ‘sich fortpflanzen’. Forwe could say: ‘Die wirtschaftliche Krise pflanzt sich in den be-nachbarten Ländern fort’. This meaning does not necessarily de-scribe a new generation of something, but only an extension ofsomething (a form or order or even disorder) in something else,without the new generation of this something else. The ‘formativepower’ in this sense would be an immaterial power that is trans-ferred to and spread out in something else: namely matter, with-out generating matter. It only generates a new form of matter – itsorganization. The cited sentence would say that in the organizedbeing an immaterial formative power is transferred to and spreadout in matter, which does not have a formative power originally. Itthereby generates a new organization in this matter. It self-orga-nizes matter.eβ) In German ‘to propagate (sich fortpflanzen)’ is used literal-ly with regard to plants, animals, and humans. However, Kantclaims the self-propagating capacity not with regard to plants, ani-mals, and humans but with regard to a power. In this sense, the«self-propagating formative power [eine sich fortpflanzende bil-
dende Kraft]» can have a self-reflexive meaning, namely ‘a formativepower that propagates itself (eine sich selbst fortpflanzende bil-
27 My italics.28 My italics.
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dende Kraft)’. The formative power would then be a power thatgenerates and/or preserves itself. How can we make sense of sucha claim without making it sound mystical? A possible self-reflexivereading would be to say that a formative power is a self-explana-tory and self-evident basic power. In his writing Teleological prin-
ciples, written two years before the Critique of the power of judg-
ment in 1788, Kant describes such a basic power as follows:[We] can only know a basic power through the relation of a cause to aneffect […]. Now the concept of an organic being is this: that it is a materi-al being which is possible only through the relation of everything con-tained in it to each other as end and means […]. Therefore a basic powerthat is effectuated through an organization has to be thought as a causeeffective according to ends, and this in such a manner that these endshave to be presupposed for the possibility of the effect. But we knowsuch powers, in terms of their ground of determination only in ourselves,namely in our understanding and will, as a cause of the possibility of cer-tain products that are arranged entirely according to ends, namely thatof works of art. In us understanding and will are basic powers, of whichthe latter, insofar as it is determined by the former, is a faculty to pro-duce something according to an idea which is called an end.29The formative power then would be a final and fundamental pur-pose (or end) setting force of nature, which cannot lead back to an-otherprinciple. Equivalent to the human understanding and will asinner capacities (causes), it brings about an end as its effect andgenerates the order among the means to achieve this end.Given d) and e) it is likely that the formative power itself isnot a power of generation. Although Kant calls this power ‘fort-pflanzend’ it does not necessarily function as seminal fluid. Theimmaterial, natural formative power is a basic, ordering and
form30 giving principle which is directed towards an end or pur-
29 Teleological principles 8:180.18-181.14.30 The majority of passages throughout the second half of the third Critique supports areading according to which the formative power is responsible for the form of the being;see for instance CPJ 5:369.33-370.15, 373.4-34, 377.1-23, 378.12-379.9, 407.13-409.22,410.16-411.29. This reading seems contradicted at some points, but even passageswhich could be read as suggesting a formative force that generates matter should be un-derstood as suggesting that the formative power only selects the required matter: it«might always be possible that in, e.g. an animal body, many parts could be conceived asconsequences of merely mechanical laws […]. Yet the cause that provides the appropriatematerial, modifies it, forms it, and deposits it in its appropriate place must always bejudged teleologically, so that everything in it must be considered as organized, and every-thing is also, in a certain relation to the thing itself, an organ in turn [Es mag immer sein,
daß z.B. in einem thierischen Körper manche Theile als Concretionen nach bloß mecha-
nischen Gesetzen begriffen werden können […]. Doch muß die Ursache, welche die dazu
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pose, and spreads out its organizing and ordering capacity in mat-ter. But it does not necessarily bring matter into existence.In the second passage of those that Kant authorized for pub-lishing, i.e. in §8131, Kant uses the term ‘formative power’ only aspart of a description of contemporary approaches in his time, butnot as a characteristic term in his own theory. Nevertheless it isdecisive that also in this passage the formative power is a «purpo-
sive formative power»32. Using Blumenbach’s theory as an exam-ple, Kant demonstrates that the formative drive – Blumenbach’sterm for the equivalent to Kant’s formative power – is responsiblefor an «original organization» of matter, which brings matter «intothe form of a self-preserving purposiveness»33. Also regardingBlumenbach’s view, Kant claims that the formative drive is thecause of the purposive form of an organism, even though in thispassage it is less clear whether Blumenbach understood the for-mative drive as a material or immaterial capacity.Since the investigated propositions shed more light on themeaning of ‘formative’ (form-giving, cause of form) than of ‘pow-er’, a closer consideration of Kant’s metaphysical view of the no-tion of power or force would be required. I want to outline brieflyhow such an investigation could proceed: as Kant says in the first
Critique34, power or force is a «predicable», i.e. it is not one of thecategories or «ancestral concepts [Stammbegriffe] of pure under-standing», but a derivative concept, subordinate to the category ofcausality (which is, itself not further specified as efficient or finalcausality)35. In the Teleological principles Kant says that power is:
schickliche Materie herbeischafft, diese so modificirt, formt und an ihren gehörigen Stellen
absetzt, immer teleologisch beurtheilt werden, so daß alles an ihm organisirt betrachtet
werden muß, und alles auch in gewisser Beziehung auf das Ding wiederum Organ ist]» (CPJ5:377.17-23).31 CPJ 5:423.12-424.6.32 CPJ 5:424.4, my italics.33 CPJ 5:424.23-34, my italics.34 CPR A 81-2/B 107-8.35 For further explanation, Kant alludes to ontological textbooks of his time. More pre-cisely, however, than relevant passages in Baumgarten’s Metaphysica (§§127-36), for in-stance, are the few remarks regarding the terminological character of the notion ‘power’in Kant’s own writings. In Baumgartens Metaphysica, which Kant himself used in his lec-tures on metaphysics, the notion of ‘power’ or ‘force’ is treated in the §§127-36, on sub-stance and accidence. In §131 Baumgarten claims: «Wenn in einer Substanz Accidenzienwürklich sind, so muß diese Würklichkeit 1) einen Grund haben […] und der wird eineKraft in der weitern Bedeutung genennt […], und 2) einen hinreichenden Grund […]. Die-ser ist die Kraft in der engeren Bedeutung [If the accidences are real in a substance, thisreality must 1) have a ground […] which is named power in the broader sense […], andmust have 2) a sufficient ground […]. And this ground is the power in the narrower
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Not what contains the ground of the reality of the accidences (since thisis the substance), but is only the relation of the substance to the acci-dences insofar as the substance entails the ground of their reality36.Nearly identical37 to this is Kant’s claim in his writing Discovery(1790) that:Power is not what entails the ground of the existence of the accidence(since this is the substance), but is only the notion of the relation of thesubstance to the latter [the accidences] insofar it [the substance] entailstheir ground, and this relation is entirely different from inherence38.As I take it, these remarks suggest that the formative power canbe read as part of an account of final causation: within the orga-nized being the formative power is intentionally directed towardsthe (idea of a) purpose and organizes the accidences of an organicsubstance such that their relation to the substance is formed by(the idea of) the purpose.
1.2. Formative power as form giving: the meaning of ‘form’Now I return again to the question as to what it means to say thatthe formative power causes the ‘form’ of the matter of an organism.White suggests that ‘form’ does not describe the physical outershape of an organism but rather means that an individual organismshares the basic properties of its species: the «form of a naturalthing […] is equivalent to the species of that thing»39. Richards, incontrast, argues that ‘form’ is used as a synonym for ‘archetype’,and in doing so takes ‘archetype’ as a common pattern underlyingeven the diversity of species. Kant
sense». He continues in §132: «Die Kraft in der engern Bedeutung ist […] der hinreichendeGrund aller Accidenzien […] folglich ist sie eine Substanz, und in so ferne die Accidenzienin ihr würklich seyn können, das Substantielle [The power in the narrower sense is […]the sufficient ground of all accidences […] and thus it is a substance, and, insofar the ac-cidences can be real in it, the substantial». Accidences are the parts and properties ofsuch a substance (§135).36 «Kraft ist nicht das, was den Grund der Wirklichkeit der Accidenzen enthält (das ist die
Substanz), sondern ist blos das Verhältnis der Substanz zu den Accidenzen, so fern sie den
Grund ihrer Wirklichkeit enthält» (Teleological principles 8:181.35-8).37 See also Negative magnitudes (1763, 2:201.23-204.11), and Met. Herder (1762-4,28:23.29-28.14).38 «Die Kraft ist nicht das, was den Grund der Existenz der Accidenzen enthält (denn den
enthält die Substanz): sondern ist der Begriff von dem bloßen Verhältnisse der Substanz zu
den letzteren, so fern sie den Grund derselben enthält, und dieses Verhältnis ist von dem der
Inhärenz gänzlich unterschieden» (Discovery VIII 224.35-9).39 See D.A. White, op. cit., p. 137.
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saw in the Bildungstrieb a way to understand the nature of organic form.In his consideration of this topic, he broached two interrelated concep-tions […] the ‘archetype’ […] [and] a gradual biological development, thatis, an evolution […] of animal forms out of the inorganic, and their con-tinued transformation into the multitude of species. In his discussion,Kant admitted that animal species, despite their variety, seemed to dis-play common patterns, or archetypes [Urbilde].40White’s view suggests that the formative power drives an or-ganism to fulfill the formal conditions of its species, which – ac-cording to Kant’s account (as I take it) – would be represented asan empirical concept in our human understanding. Such an empir-ical concept of the understanding would be abstracted by meansof a comparison of many organisms and would encompass thecommon features shared by all members of a species. Richards’view suggests that the formative power drives an organism to ful-fill the formal conditions of its archetype. In this claim, Richardsconfuses Kant’s terms – since an archetype, for Kant, is not a spe-cies concept, i.e. an empirical concept abstracted from a group ofindividuals and represented in the human consciousness, and alsonot a concept that underlies several species, but an a priori, origi-nal intuition of an organism in God’s consciousness41. It is the re-presentation of a being in a divine, intuitive understanding, whichis inaccessible to the human understanding. An archetype doesnot underlie the species or the diversity of several species, buteach individual as an individual and representative of its species.There are objections to both readings. White’s view that theformative power is form giving in the sense that it causes the di-rectedness of the formal properties of an organism to the speciesseems too narrow. It is inconsistent with Kant’s claim that an indi-vidual organism is an end (purpose, idea) in itself, i.e. that the for-mative power forms exactly this individual insofar as it fulfills thisindividual idea of its purpose or end. I doubt whether fulfilling thecommon features of the species of an oak tree, or fulfilling thecommon features of the species of a polar bear, or fulfilling thecommon features of being a human being is precisely the same asfulfilling the purpose of what this individual oak tree, of this indi-vidual polar bear, of this individual woman is supposed to be. If
40 R.J. Richards, Kant and Blumenbach on the Bildungstrieb cit., p. 28. See also Id., Early
theories of development: Blumenbach and Kant, in The romantic conception of life cit., p.232.41 CPJ 5:405.1-410.11, 5:408.19.
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we take ‘form’ as species, the idea of the individual purpose of asingular being is lost.In addition, the concept of ‘form’ interpreted as specieswould entail those general and common features that are ab-stracted from the observation of a group of similar, empirically givenorganisms. But it is clear from Kant’s text that what Kant calls the‘form’ of an organism is not represented by an empirical conceptof understanding, but by an idea of reason:Since reason must be able to cognize the necessity in every form of a natu-ralproduct if it would understand the conditions connected with its gen-eration, the contingency of their form with respect to all empirical laws ofnature in relation to reason is itself a ground for regarding their causalityas if it were possible only through reason.42An archetype (as I take Richards’ claim in a corrected, more ap-propriate Kantian sense) is the a priori, original intuition of a beingin God’s consciousness43. It is the representation of a being in a di-vine, intuitive understanding. If, as Richards suggests, the forma-tive power is form giving in the sense that it orders the formal fea-tures of an organism such that they are directed towards the ‘arc-hetype’ of the being in God’s consciousness, this archetype at leastentails both, i.e. the features of a being as an individual and as apart of its species, since God has complete insight into a being. In-sofar, Richards’ view (the way I amend it) would be more appro-priate than White’s reading in which the instantiation of the spe-cies in an individual is missed. However, the intuition of an arche-type is not accessible to our human understanding, and the forma-tive power according to this view would be directed towards aform that is only present and transparent in God’s consciousness.But this also seems to contradict Kant’s claim that the formativepower of an organism is directed towards an end that isrepresented as a concept of reason – since God’s consciousness isa divine understanding that is never addressed by Kant as reasonbut as understanding, and which does not cognize based on con-cepts or ideas, but based on intuitions.As a solution, I suggest a reading that includes but cannot bereduced to White’s view and is in line although not identical withRichards’ view. In saying that the formative power strives to fulfillthe form of an organism, by ‘form’ Kant means the purpose or end
42 CPJ 5:370.5-12, partly my italics.43 CPJ 5:408.19.
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of the being that is represented for us as an idea of reason. Thisidea of a purpose includes both that a being fulfills the formal fea-tures of its species (thus it includes White’s claim) and that it is anindividual displaying the formal features of a species in a specific,individual way (thus it claims more than White’s view). For, sinceKant argues that the teleological or final law unifies the particularempirical laws of nature that apply to an organism44, we can con-clude that the idea of a purpose not only entails the common andgeneral features shared by all members of the species but also itsindividual implementation, and even those features which are ir-relevant for the implementation of the species and are just addi-tional individual peculiarities of an organism that might on thesurface be redundant, contingent, or inconsistent with the pur-pose of the being.According to §§76-7, the purpose or end of an organic beingis represented as an intuition or archetype in a divine conscious-ness by an intuitive understanding; whereas it appears in our hu-man consciousness as an idea represented by the faculty of rea-son. But the representation of a purposive being in God’s con-sciousness is thought to be the archetype for the representation ofthe purposive being in our human consciousness as its ectype. In-sofar there is some truth in Richards’ claim that the form that theformative power brings about in an organism is the divine intui-tion of its archetype or Urbild, for which reason’s idea of a purposeis a limited ectype in our human consciousness. But it would bemore appropriate to claim equally that the formative power causesthe purposive form of the organism, which is represented in ourhuman consciousness as reason’s idea of the purpose of the organ-ism, and in the divine consciousness as God’s intuition or of thearchetype of the organism.
2. The formative power as a cause of the purposive form of
organisms: Kant’s tree exampleTo demonstrate the principle of organic self-generation (self-formation), scholars usually rely on Kant’s famous tree example in§64 of the Critique of the power of judgment – but unfortunatelyoften only to provide a synopsis of Kant’s text. My reading ofKant’s formative power as a form-giving principle has direct con-sequences for the interpretation of the threefold generative fun-
44 See CPJ §70, 5:386.21-387.9.
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ction that Kant ascribes to the formative power in §64 of the Criti-
que of the power of judgment. The self-generation of a tree withregards to its species, as an individual, and in its parts as causedby the formative power, does not imply in general the generationof the form and matter of the tree, or in particular the generationof its matter, but only the causation of the purposive form of thematter of the tree.Kant’s first claim regarding the tree is that:A tree generates another tree in accordance with a known natural law.However, the tree that it generates is of the same species, and so it gene-rates itself as far as the species is concerned, in which it, on one side aseffect, in the other as cause, unceasingly produces itself, and likewise, of-ten producing itself, continuously preserves itself, as species.45In this quote Kant provides a description of the self-generation ofan organism on the level of its species. Scholars mostly recon-struct this statement as claiming that a tree brings about themembers of its species, i.e. as saying that, by means of its forma-tive power, a tree generates itself regarding both, namely matterand form. But if so, where does the first tree come from? Howdoes it come into existence? Does it generate itself – its matter, itsform – out of nothing? What is the ‘it’ in ‘itself’, if ‘it’, i.e. the firstmember of a species does not already exist? Where is the forma-tive power if it is not in the tree since a tree does not exist yet? Toavoid being committed to the obscurity of a generatio ex nihilo,scholars46 suggest that the term species can be applied not beforethe first two members of the species exist47. Kant’s modified claimthen would be that it is significant for organisms that two alreadyexisting members of a species can reproduce the matter and formof further members of their species based on their formative power,and thereby preserve their species. This claim is less vulnerable,
45 CPJ 5:371.7-12.46 See T. Cheung, op. cit.47 This view is supported by a remark in §82 of the CPJ (5:425.24-33), where Kantclaims, that «in the organization of the two sexes in relation to one another for thepropagation of their kind» the first pair of each species constitutes an original«organizing whole, although not one that is organized in a single body». Cheung refers tothis passage in his discussion of the self-generation claim regarding the species.Probably he does not press Kant’s position with questions like mine since he readsKant’s view in §82 into Kant’s claims in §64, and therefore sees no reason to ask for theself-generation of the first two members of a species. But one could also draw intoquestion (as I do) the persuasiveness of Kant’s claim that the first pair of the speciesfunctions as «an organizing whole, although not one that is organized in a single body».
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but (somehow arbitrarily) excludes the first two members of thespecies from the self-generation claim, and in doing so the organicgeneration of these two members of the species remains in needof explanation.Alternatively one could avoid the obscurity of a generatio ex
nihilo by arguing that the self-preservation of an organism re-garding its species concerns only the self-preservation of the formbut not of the matter and form of the members of a species. ThenKant’s weaker claim would be that, based on their formative power,organisms preserve themselves regarding their form, and therebypreserve their species. This claim has the advantage that it is notcommitted to an explanation of the origin of the matter of themembers of the species and does not exclude the first two mem-bers of the species from the claim that the formative power is re-sponsible for the preservation of the form of the species. The dis-advantage of this reading is that it is not by itself sufficient as anexplanation of the generation of a species of organisms, since anadditional explanation is required to give an account as to, wherethe matter of organisms comes from and how the formative poweritself was brought into existence (I return to this point in sectionIII of the paper).Kant’s second claim regarding the tree example is that:A tree also generates itself as an individual. This sort of effect we call […]growth; but this is […] distinct from […] increase in magnitude in accor-dance with mechanical laws […]. This plant first prepares the matter thatit adds to itself with a quality peculiar to its species […] and develops it-self further by means of material which, as far as its composition is con-
cerned, is its own product. For although as far as the components that itreceives from nature outside of itself are concerned, it must be regardedonly as educt, nevertheless in the separation and new composition of thisraw material there is to be found an originality of the capacity for separa-
tion and formation in this sort of natural being.48In this quote, Kant provides a second description of the self-gene-ration of an organism on the level of an individual. It is importantto note that Kant equates self-generation here to an explanation ofthe growth of the individual organism. Thereby he distinguishesbetween a statement regarding the matter and a statement re-garding the form of an organism. Kant claims that an organism’sgrowth appears as an «educt» regarding its matter: the tree rece-
48 CPJ 5:371.13-29, italics partly added.
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ives matter «from nature outside of itself». But it appears as a«product» regarding the «separation and new composition» of(the form) of matter, since the tree demonstrates an «originalityof the capacity for separation and formation» of the matter. Theseclaims clearly support the view that the self-generative aspect of atree is only concerned with the generation of a specific form of anorganism but not of its matter. Whereas the tree receives matterpassively «from nature outside of itself», the «originality» (namelythe self-organization) of the form – the «separation», «formation»,and «composition» of the matter is its own product.This is suggested also by Kant’s application of two terms,«educt» and «product», which have a specific meaning for Kant andin Kant’s time. The term «product» belongs to an epigenetic ac-count of natural generation. «Production» describes the intrinsicself-generation or self-causation of nature. The term «educt», how-ever, belongs to a preformistic view of supernatural creation. ‘Edu-cation’ in this sense designates a subordinate act of natural causa-tion, accompanied by the superordinate divine act of creation andsupernatural causation of nature49. ‘E-ducation’ means the secon-dary enfolding of features of an organism by nature that a primarydivine act of creation sets into the germ of the organism. Thismeans that also the second level of the tree example suggests a self-generation of the form of the individual organism only, whereas itneglects the self-generation of its matter (the term «educt» regard-ing the generation of matter suggests a theological causation ofmatter – I will come back to this point in section 3).Kant’s third claim regarding the tree example says that:One part of this creature [the tree] also generates itself in such a waythat the preservation of the one is reciprocally dependent on the preser-vation of the others. An eye from the leaf of one tree grafted into the twig
49 See: «The idea of a being that would be the author of itself would be the original beingand a product (not educt) of pure practical reason [Die Idee von einem Wesen das von
sich selbst Urheber wäre, würde das Urwesen seyn und ein Product (nicht Edukt) der rei-
nen practischen Vernunft]» (OP 22:130.13-5). See also Kant on prestabilism: «presta-
bilism can in turn proceed in two ways. Namely, it considers each organic being gen-erated from its own kind as either the educt or the product of the latter. The system ofgeneratings as mere educts is called that of individual preformation or the theory of evo-
lution; the system of generatings as products is called the system of epigenesis. The lattercan also be called the system of generic preformation, since the productive capacity ofthe progenitor is still preformed in accordance with the internally purposive predisposi-tions that were imparted to its stock, and thus the specific form was preformed virtua-
liter. Given this, the opposing theory of individual preformation might better be calledthe theory of involution (or that of encapsulation)» (CPJ 5:422.36-423.11).
46 Ina Goy
of another brings forth a growth of its own kind in an alien stock, andsimilarly a scion attached to another trunk. Hence one can regard everytwig or leaf of one tree as merely grafted or inoculated into it, hence as atree existing in itself, which only depends on the other and nourishes it-self parasitically. At the same time, the leaves are certainly products ofthe tree, yet they preserve it in turn, for repeated defoliation would killit, and its growth depends upon their effect on the stem. The self-help ofnature in the case of injury [...] I mention only in passing.50In this quote Kant presents another aspect of the self-generationand self-formation of an organism on the level of its parts. In theprocedure of inoculation and grafting, the eye of a leaf or a twig(«scion [Pfropfreis]»), for instance of a cherry tree, grafted into thestem of an apple tree, fulfills the form and function of an apple leafor twig, even though its matter continues to grow as a cherry leafor twig. Although the matter of the leaf or the twig grafted into anapple tree remains the matter of a cherry leaf or twig, its form andfunction carries over and substitutes the functions and form of anapple leaf or twig. This means the cherry leaf or twig serves to ful-fill the specific function of the part of an apple tree and in doing sosupports the purpose of the apple tree as a whole.In addition, Kant claims that one could even consider twigswhich originally belong to the apple tree as twigs which (as appletwigs) have been grafted into the apple tree. This equation of ap-ple and cherry twigs clearly concerns the functional or formalequivalence of both kinds of twigs regardless of whether theirmatter is apple or cherry like. Thus, Kant’s third consideration canalso be read in support of my view that Kant’s claim about theformative power as cause of the self-generation of organisms is aclaim about the self-formation of organisms, but not a claim aboutthe generation of their matter.
3. God and natureSo far I have argued that the formative power brings about thepurposive form of an organism, where form is understood as thepurpose (end, function) of an organism. The formative power causesthe directedness of the properties of an organism towards its pur-pose. The form or purpose of an organism is represented in ourhuman cognition by an idea of reason, and in God’s consciousnessas the divine intuition of an archetype. As already indicated, Kant’saccount of the formative power does not suffice to explain the
50 CPJ 5:371.30-372.10.
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generation of organisms entirely, since it does not explain thegeneration of matter and the generation of the formative poweritself. Are the matters and mechanical laws, and are the formativepower and teleological laws of organic nature created or eternal?I will try to outline an account that consistently connects tothe already established interpretation. Kant’s most sophisticated51discussion on the relationship between God and nature, i.e. be-tween divine and natural orders, can be found in his early essay
Argument (1763). Already in this writing, three decades beforethe Critique of the power of judgment, Kant uses the tree exampleas evidence for an account of organic self-formation grounded inan account of divine creation. He claims that the structure ofplants and animals displays a constitution that cannot be ex-plained by appeal to universal and necessary laws of nature alone:It is utterly unintelligible to us that a tree should be able, in virtue of aninternal mechanical constitution, to form and process its sap in such away that there should arise in the bud or the seed something containinga tree like itself in miniature, or something from which the tree could de-velop.52The complete explanation of organic generation can be given onthe basis of a «revised method of physico-theology» which posesGod not only as an «Architect» of the form of the world but also asthe «creator» of its matter53. Kant argues for the «complete de-pendency of nature upon God»54. God appears as both the first su-pernatural cause of the formal and of the material structures ofnature. The creation of nature is «materially supernatural» sinceGod is «the immediate efficient cause» of natural objects, and it is«formally supernatural» since God’s supernatural power causes«the manner in which the forces of nature are directed to produc-ing the effect»55. The specific directedness of natural powers and
51 The discussion of the relation between God and the laws of nature in Kant’s Argumentcovers more than 70 pages. It is exceedingly instructive and precise, even compared toother elaborate theological writings like Kant’s Religion (1794) or other writings onbiology like the second half of the third Critique (1790).52 Argument 2:114.31-115.4. This thought resembles the third aspect of the tree examplein §64 of the Critique of the power of judgment. In this early passages Kant imagines thatthe idea of the whole tree is somehow present in the twig so that the twig itself developslike a new tree.53 Argument 2:123.1-2.54 Argument 2:125.18-27.55 Argument 2:104.2-7.
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their effects is not itself subject to a rule of nature. Natural lawscan only be secondary causes of nature56.The dependence of natural secondary causes on supernatur-al (material and formal) first causes can be consistently read intothe relation of God and nature in the third Critique. This is becauseit is possible to say that God according to the account of the third
Critique is the first efficient cause of nature, which brings naturalmaterials into existence, and endows them with mechanical lawsas secondary causes. In addition, the divine intuitions of purposesare the first formal and teleological causes of nature. To supportthese divine formal causes, God implants the formative power andteleological laws in nature as secondary natural laws and powers.By means of the formative power and teleological laws of nature,God causes the directedness of the mechanical natural powers andtheir effects towards the purpose of the organic object.One could raise the objection that the Argument essay, writ-ten in 1763, is a pre-critical writing whereas the Critique of the
power of judgment, written 1790, belongs to the end of the criticalperiod. Kant’s (physico-)theological views might have changedover the years, and we are not allowed to re-introduce pre-criticalviews into his critical philosophy and theology. I admit thestrength of this objection in principle. However, Kant still claimsthe formal and material dependency of nature’s generation on Godin his lectures on rational theology, held in the 1780s57, i.e. duringthe period of the writing of the Critique of the power of judgment.And one should also be aware of the changes that Kant’s theologi-cal views undergo in the critical period, especially regarding thephysico-theological argument. The argument is under attack inKant’s first Critique. In 1781 Kant does not only criticize the phy-sico-theological idea of God for being merely regulative, but alsofor the internal inconsistencies depending on the inconsistenciesof the ontological argument that it implies58. The physico-theolo-gical argument disappears entirely in 1788 in Kant’s second Criti-
que. But in 1790, and this is the decisive point, it reappears at theend of the third Critique in §8559. And it even reappears in a newlight, namely not as one of the criticized proofs for the existence ofGod as in the first Critique, but as the penultimate step in the criti-
56 Argument 2:126.5-137.6.57 Pölitz, 28/2.2:1094-8, 1196-9.58 CPR A 620-30/B 648-58.59 CPJ 5:436.3-442.10, 476.17-480.36.
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cal system which has a limited explanatory function within thecritical system: to account for the unity of the theoretical (i.e. theteleological and mechanical) laws of nature. The differences be-tween the accounts in the Argument essay and the third Critiqueare that Kant treats the physico-theological God in the third Criti-
que as a regulative idea, whereas in the pre-critical Argument es-say he discusses it as a proof for the existence of such a God. Addi-tionally, in the third Critique Kant introduces the formative poweras a secondary teleological cause of nature and ascribes nature apower that – although created – is a spontaneous ordering force ofnature. That is to say, Kant increases nature’s independence, al-though only within the boundaries of a theological view. Takingfact that all natural causes are secondary causes for Kant, his phi-losophy of biology turns out to be more traditionalist than onewould have expected.Proposal: 04/04/2012, Review: 17/11/2012, Publication: 21/12/2012
Kant’s strong theological commitments into consideration, and the
